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Abstract: The analyses carried out both at the centre (Brussels) and at the destination (member states) 
(ab)use of the principle that in public expenditure terms “spent money means well-spent money” and 
consider that absorption capacity equals economic performance (equated quite disputably with disparity 
reduction).  The  aggregate  Keynesian  perspective  provides  the  main  argument  in  favour  of  this 
interpretation:  EU  funds  lead  to  GDP  growth  (economic  growth).  This  vision  overlooks  the  crucial 
importance of resource allocation micro-processes, private property and business activity. Therewith, the 
process of making European funds profitable and, consequently, the EU convergence feasible depends on 
the extent to which the absorption environment is structurally reformed. The “cohesion paradox,” which 
can be formulated like “least underdeveloped regions have relatively higher chances to attract European 
funds, while disparities compared to relatively less developed regions might even intensify”, can be broken 
only through multi-dimensional reform, immaterial to whether we speak about Romania, or Ireland, or 
Portugal, or Spain, or Greece. 
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Economic and social cohesion (issues) 
On convergence dialectics. Nominal versus real convergence  
The two large types of convergence – nominal and real – are usually considered at least distinct if not 
somehow opposite. The distinction itself between the two follows a classical separation – between real 
economy (aspects related to production, commerce, services) and symbolic economy (aspects related to the 
financial-monetary part of an economy). However, this distinction is artificial to a certain extent – even if it 
has a heuristic-operational utility – and rather recalls the vision that in economy money is a mere “veil”, 
cash and financial flows being only the necessary consequence of real flow movement. From another 
perspective, that of a paradigm that considers money itself a driving force of the market, the separation 
between  the  real  and  the  symbolic  (or  real  and  nominal,  to  use  the  same  words)  decisively  looses 
relevance. Why  would the  unemployment rate be, let us say, a  more  “real” aspect of the economical 
situation of a certain area than the inflation rate? In other words, why would the possibility to get a job 
necessarily be more “real,” more tangible, than the reduction in the purchasing power? 
In view to extrapolate the above, we might point out that there is no difference of nature between nominal 
and real convergence issues; on the contrary, the two of them can reinforce each other. The so-called 
nominal convergence would be an important premise of real convergence to the extent that, on one hand, 
nominal exigencies “clean up government’s behaviour” and, on the other hand, “the main ingredients of 
economic growth are the private property, the free entrepreneurship and  the accumulation of capital” 344 
(which presupposes a healthy currency to allow accurate business calculations). Some of the European 
economic mainstream believes that nominal convergence criteria might be incompatible with economic 
growth. The key to understanding these issues is to abandon the simplistic “numerical”157, aggregative 
vision and to adopt in exchange an entrepreneurial approach of economic performance whereby nominal 
convergence and single currency become brands of the European way of reform. Criteria are not only 
displays  of  an  anti-inflation  obsession,  “but  also  a  truly  economic  performance  framework  to  unleash 
private businesses and restrain government fiscal-monetary discretionism. Nominal convergence criteria 
are a key ingredient for real convergence!” (Spiridon 2004, pp. 22-23) 
Natural convergence and “self-chosen disparities”  
The simple but fundamental question to which the ordinary treatment of the convergence and cohesion 
issue fails to answer is: why cohesion or convergence (howsoever they may be expressed) is necessarily 
beneficial for everybody. And here there is possible that certain communities do not recognise generally 
accepted standards (GDP/capita, productivity; employment; infrastructure, etc) as elements of welfare. If 
we think – from the perspective that Romania is an orthodox country – of the orthodox areas populated 
with monasteries (Mount Athos; certain areas of Moldavia), it might be possible that the similarity with 
rich areas from the EU’s hard core will not only be a priority but quite an inconvenient. Moreover, in order 
to reach certain internal consistency, the European model – that treasures non-discrimination ideal - should 
reflect on the particular communities issue (we could add here a part of the gypsy community) and on how 
such communities see the desideratum to “converge” with the rest of the European communities. 
Therefore,  the  idea  of  “self-chosen  disparity”  should  be  firstly  accepted  during  the  discussion  on 
convergence  and  only  then,  should  the  convergence  issue  be  raised.  This  point,  however,  leads  to  a 
fundamental question:  how  necessary is government or inter-governmental intervention (especially the 
cohesion policy instruments) to build convergence. Even the underlying neoclassic model of the absolute 
beta convergence idea recognises the normal convergence of a space/area within which capital and labour 
force (not to mention goods and services) circulate freely. Thus, economic policy measures for cohesion 
might concentrate on building this necessary premise: freedom of circulation, because there is the risk that 
the attempts to go beyond natural convergence might actually undermine it.  
Cohesion policy and its possible weak sides  
In principle (back to Economic Fundamentals)… 
Basically,  the  European  Union  economical-social  cohesion  policy  reduces  to  two  large  instruments: 
intergovernmental transfers of funds and regulations. 
The economic theories indicate us two major obstacles to its success: calculation chaos and moral hazard. 
•  Moral hazard: a (national or European) public/civil servant is not motivated by profit & loss 
to behave for the interest of the taxpayer-consumer. If it is possible for him to establish a 
“priority” or to change the result of a public tender in favour of political clientele, his county 
or simply to his family, nothing can guarantee he will not do it. 
•  Economic calculation: the fundamental instrument that  makes possible for the production 
structure such as that of modern contemporary economies to be maintained through rational 
allocation of resources is monetary calculation. If expected revenues  from an investment 
project do not exceed expenses (both present and anticipated), the concerned project will not 
be carried out at market conditions (under voluntary exchange conditions). In general, the so-
                                                            
157  The rationale of instruments emphasizing real convergence (sigma, beta versions – absolute or conditional) 
does not start from realistic intuitive elements, but it is a product of the use of mathematical-statistical tool: dispersion 
and regression. In other words, no fundamental issues related to convergence are raised (what is it and especially, why 
is this beneficial), but it is tried to give the answer to an implicit question like “what can we say about convergence by 
using the statistical-mathematical tool.” The official methodology favours the statistical correlation for the detriment of 
fundamental causal economical explanations. The impact of a measure of policy (e.g.: cohesion policy) cannot be 
observed either empirically or by putting the empirical measurements into a model, despite the quantitative precision 
impression of the model observations or results. See, for example, the non-homogenous assumptions (and the results) 
between the three models used in the European Commission’s report (HERMIN, EcoMod and QUEST) partly inspired 
by new-Keynesian theories that can demonstrate how imperfect this way of decrypting economy remains. 345 
called  disadvantaged  areas  have,  due  to  various  reasons  (remoteness,  unqualified  and 
relatively expensive labour, low demand, ill-conceived regulations etc.), few chances to carry 
out profitable projects. The idea of regional policy based on intergovernmental transfers of 
funds disregards this very type of market verdict. The market gives the following message 
through its business elite: in such and such region, currently such and such projects are not 
feasible (profitable); bureaucracy disputes this very verdict of the market without, however, 
having the intellectual instruments to actually do/replace it (that very monetary calculations it 
had given away)! 
Then, the persistence of disparities despite cohesion assistance should be interpreted differently. This may 
mean that either institutional incentives are still weak or adverse natural data cannot be overcame or that 
self-chosen disparities may exist (see previous comments), so the ‘remedy’ should be accordingly asserted 
and applied in order not to broke the very principle of any cure: primo non nocere. 
… and in practice (back to Benchmark Integration) 
The Irish case: reduction of public expenditure, superior to the incoming European funds  
For the occurrence of „the Celtic Tiger” phenomenon multi-causal explanations are often given, such as 
European transfers (agricultural subsidies, plus structural funds and cohesion funds), “knowledge-based 
economy”, or the deregulation and fiscal –budgetary exemption. Nevertheless, which is the true story of 
Irish success?
  
In the last two hundred years, Ireland has been the poorest region in the British archipelago. After the 
accession of Ireland to the EEC, in 1973, “the catching up” has become the main objective, but the initial 
instruments have been typical for the governmental Keynesian activism: high public expenses in order to 
absorb unemployment, high taxes, high credits for the public sector. The public debt level also became 
very high, but taxes, extremely high, could not be safely increased anymore.  
Belonging  to  the  ECC  has  deprived  Ireland  of  monetary  “expedients”  such  as  monetary  inflationary 
expansion  in  order  to  finance  the  public  debt  was  incompatible  with  membership  of  the  European 
Monetary System (EMS). The Irish government had to discover other principles of action, which would be 
regarded in the nowadays social Europe as “attacks” to economic democracy: in 1988, the government 
from Dublin applied the most drastic reduction of public expenses in the last decades
158, solving the fiscal 
crisis. The economic freedom extended vigorously, and the role of the government in economy diminished 
adequately. 
The Irish recipe of development would be the classical recipe (ante- and anti- Keynesian): the decrease of 
weight of the public sector in the economy, small and balanced budgets, monetary stability, free foreign 
trade. Another Irish “secret” of early stage reform: absence of populism and trans-party compromise. The 
power and the opposition were hand in hand in 1987, year ‚0’ of reforms, with social partners getting 
involved in a „social contract” both responsible and responsibility fostering: the government committed 
itself to low taxes and low inflation rates in exchange for payment requests moderation on the part of trade 
unions.  
The virtuous and disciplinary effects of EU membership materialized between 1990 and 1995 in form of a 
very  responsible  monetary  and  fiscal  behaviour  –  the  Maastricht  criteria  have  disciplined  the  public 
finances (the budget deficit and the public debt), and the perspective of adopting the Euro has disciplined 
monetary management.  
At the same time, the tax burden was to be relaxed both at the income tax and corporate profit tax level. 
Subsequently, the government from Dublin shocked once again. Accused by the states from the same 
„social  Europe”,  whose  capitals  migrated  towards  the  island,  for  „distorting  competition”  due  to  the 
existence of some “special areas”
159, where corporate taxes amounted to 10% (while the general level 
amounted to 24%), Ireland had to comply and levelled taxes to only 12,5%.  
After a sustained forcing with growth rates of over 5% between 1990-1995 and over 9% between 1996-
2000 – and somewhat lower afterwards (we will see why) –, with important capital inflows (especially 
American), flourishing exports, a good demographic growth (as compared to the continent’s „hardcore”), 
                                                            
158 For example the costs for health have been reduced by 6%, those for education by 7%, agriculture had a lower 
budget by 18%, the military expenses have decreased by 7%, and the roads and dwellings received 11% less! 
159 The Shannon area and the Centre for Financial Services from the International Airport Dublin. 346 
and with the acceptance of the idea of immigration, productively inserted in society and not on the pay roll 
of social security, as elsewhere, Ireland
160 has accomplished „more than catching-up”, having at present, 
after Luxemburg, the highest „positive” difference as compared to EU average: 145% the EU GDP/capita 
average.
161 
As for the European funds and the possibility for them to be the main explanation of the Irish economic 
success, we shall just notice that:  
a)  public expenses cuts were higher than the European funds entries, 
b)   there is a negative correlation between the economic growth rates and the amount of 
financial assistance
162 and 
c)   there is no other major recipient country of such transfers from the European Union (and 
nowhere else either) which had similar satisfactory performances. 
So, the Irish example is, most probably, a living proof of the force of private free enterprise. 
 
Fig. 1. Net European transfers and growth rates in Ireland (Source: Department of Finance, Ireland 
(2002)). 
 
The slowing down of the Irish economic growth, after the beginning of the 2000’s, must be interpreted 
with nuance: either by the conjuncture changes in the world economy – after 2001, USA, Ireland’ s main 
trade and investment partner, entered into a period of recession because of the volatility of the previous 
growth, which resulted in the fall of the prices of listed securities, coming from the technology intensive 
sectors („tech bubble burst”) –, or because of the occurrence of certain contagions with ideologies such as 
the „Welfare State”
163. 
None  of  these  invalidates  or  fully  accounts  for  the  recipe  and  the  significance  of  growth  spurred  by 
economic freedom. 
Portugal: the EU funds have not compensated the structural reform deficit  
Two decades have passed since Portugal joined EEC and it continues to be one of the ambiguous stories of 
the  “(financially  assisted)  development  by  European  integration”.  Providential  after  the  right-wing 
dictatorship of Salazar (which was economically rather open towards the exterior), and after the left- wing 
                                                            
160 The pre- community Estonia has also a story of the economic reform, similar in its essence: tariff and non-tariff 
unilateral “disarming”, early privatization, current and capital account liberalization, taxation unique quota, eliminated 
subventions, budget balance imposed by the law. (Magnus Feldman and Razeen Sally, “From the Soviet Union to the 
European Union: the political economy of Estonian trade policy reforms”, 1991-2000) 
161 And the second most reduced fiscal burden in EU – 31%, as compared to the average level of 46%. See also Dorgan 
(2006). 
162 Empirically, if the European funds had represented a major cause of the economic growth, it would have been 
expected that the respective growth had been the highest during the period when the fund transfers would have been 
the biggest. 
163 “Over the last 5 years, the country has been sliding into the abyss of rising government spending, indirect taxation 
increases and more regulation and state involvement in the economy.” De Vlieghere, M. et al. (2006) 347 
democracy  which  succeeded  it  (along  with  the  “Carnations  Revolution”  in  1974),  its  entry  into  the 
European Community marked the destiny of probably the most “Balkan”-like economy of Western Europe. 
Portugal’s accession in 1986 produced, until the beginning of the ’90’s, only a percentage point movement, 
as compared to the revolution in ’74, of the real convergence with, at that time, EU-12. The structural-type 
discipline – and less the fund-irrigated “catching-up” –, imposed by the EU accession, has begun to be 
treated  responsibly  only  recently,  the  latest  Portuguese  governments  choosing  for  a  long  while  to 
“sacrifice” the sanitary, nominal convergence, for a misunderstood real convergence.  
The  economic  growth,  recorded  in  Portugal,  has  stayed  below  the  EU  average,  starting  1999.  The 
convergence increased by 21 points from 1974 until 2002, reaching about 74% from the EU-12 average. 
But from a different perspective, the GDP/capita decreased from 80% the average of the future EU-25 
(1999), to 70%, last year, (or 74% from the average of the future EU-27), given the fact that fund entries 
were higher, as cohesion country, than for any other performers in catching-up! After 2000, the Czech 
Republic, Malta and Slovenia (from the group of the new EU member states), as well as Greece (from the 
old cohesion countries in EU-15) outran Portugal in GDP/capita growth rate.  
Today, Portugal’s economy is marked by chronic backwardness in the classifications of almost all the 
European economic performance indicators. (The increase of GDP in 2006 was the lowest not only in the 
European Union, but even in the entire European continent).  
The history of economic slippages in the last years shows that Portugal was the first member state to 
receive warnings of penalties for failure to comply with the Stability and Growth Pact terms – the out of 
control governmental expenses pushed the budgetary deficit in 2005 to 6,9%, the highest level in Euro land 
at that moment.  
At  present,  the  Portuguese  government,  run  by  José  Sócrates  proposes  the  continuation  of  the 
„lisbonization” of the pan-European economic reform, but the Portuguese vision seems to more clearly 
emphasize  today  a  discipline  of  means.  At  home,  Sócrates  has  already  started  to  clean  up  the  public 
finances. In his last two years as Prime-Minister, the budgetary deficit has been lowered from 6,9% to 
3,8% “and lowering”
164, and by rising the minimum legal retirement age from 60 to 65, Sócrates intends to 
continue the structural depressurization of his country’s budgetary deficit in order to bring it, in 2008, 
below the 3% limit imposed in the EU. 
If the Portuguese talk about Ireland as about a “small and atypical” economy, to which the comparison 
would not be relevant, the comparison to Spain is not at all unreasonable. Portugal shares the peninsula 
with  Spain,  which  is  a  country  perceived  as  the  locomotive  of  Iberia,  and  where  the  annual  rate  of 
economic growth has been of around 3% in the last decade (except for one year).  
The  explanation  of  the  unequal  performances  between  the  two  states  varies  among  analysts,  but  the 
essential cannot be avoided: Spain has reformed the public sector and disciplined the public finances before 
EMU accession and not afterwards, as in Portugal.  
When the interest rates converged downwards at the end of the ninth decade, with EMU joining, Portugal 
did not capitalize on the premises of economic growth by making budgetary “provisions” to cover future 
deficits, but forced an amplification of the growth rate by an expansionist budgetary-fiscal policy. The 
failure to seize this opportunity indicates why the European funds, as generous or well-oriented as they 
could be, could not find but a shaky ground for fructification. 
The  funds  represented  on  average  2,3%  from  the  Spanish  GDP  between  1990  and  2000  and  3,8% 
respectively from the Portuguese GDP, while the nominal economic growth was of 2,5% in Spain and 
2,6% in Portugal. Moreover, the contribution of the cohesion funds in the public investments was, between 
2000 and 2006 of 60%
165, the highest share in EU-15. But the result was the one already mentioned: 
growth rates which persist in remaining under the EU average. 
Instead of conclusion (Some lessons for Romania, arisen from the evaluation of the old cohesion countries 
knowledge) 
a)  the structural reforms should be carried out and improved. In accordance with different 
international  and national estimations, Romania has a moderate free market, the most 
critical  distortions  being:  the  registering  of  the  property  rights,  distortions  of  certain 
                                                            
164 The Economist, 2007. 
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markets,  numerous  zones  of  corruption  (  the  legal  and  administrative  system, 
underground economy of great extent), high taxation on employee, the number of taxes 
etc. At the same time, the extent of turning into account the European funds depends on 
how much the environment is structurally reformed. Only by means of a multilateral 
reform the „paradox of cohesion” can be broken, and this may be so expressed: the less 
underdeveloped regions have pretty larger chances to attract European funds, and the 
disparities, given the poorer regions, could grow.    
b)  the steady grow of capital supply is a necessary premise for the competitiveness and 
convergence  increase  ;  it  can  be  done  either  on  the  account  of  the  public  sector  (in 
Romania  the  public  investment,  as  a  share  of  GDP  (3%),  is  less  than  in  other  new 
member countries), or the private one. The last way implies, firstly, bringing down vast 
FDI, the way that represented the main explanation of Ireland’s success!  
c)  high investment in human resources. In the National Plan for Development, the human 
resources are on the 4th position among the most important factors of development. But, 
the direction toward the increase of the competitiveness (foremost, of the productivity) 
implies  the  creation  of  assets  and  services  that  include  high  qualified  labour.  For 
comparison, on the first place, among the decisive factors of the economic growth in the 
National Development Strategy of the Great Britain for 2003, there were: skills created 
by education and the training of the human resource, followed by the other factors. In the 
Ireland success formula also entered, before all, according to its officials, „education, 
education, education”!
166 
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Les institutions européennes ont eu, ces dernières années, une série d’initiatives visant la réglementation 
de certains aspects liés à l’activité de tourisme. Parmi ces initiatives, la Communication de la Commission 
(de 17.03.2006), intitulée « Une nouvelle politique du tourisme: renforcer le partenariat pour le tourisme 
en Europe ».  
Le Parlement européen a adopté, dans ce domaine, le 17.10.2007, une résolution qui apporte une série 
d’amendements  à  cette  « nouvelle  politique  européenne  du  tourisme ».  Tous  ceux  impliqués  dans  le 
tourisme  roumain  doivent  absolument  connaître  les  prévisions  de  ces  documents  des  institutions 
européennes, afin d’adopter leurs politiques et stratégies futures. 
 
Mots-clé : tourisme, politique, stratégie, objectifs, mesures 
1.  Initiatives  et  mesures  concernant  le  tourisme,  adoptées  par  les  institutions 
européennes 
Parmi  les  plus  importantes  initiatives  et  mesures  visant  le  tourisme,  adoptées  par  les  institutions 
européennes, dans les dernières années, on peut mentionner les suivantes [1]: 
•  On a mis en place, auprès de la Commission Européenne, un « Groupe Durabilité du tourisme 
européen », composé d’une représentation équilibrée de tous les « acteurs » importants du 
tourisme et chargé de proposer un cadre d’action détaillé, nécessaire à l’élaboration d’un 
« Agenda 21 du tourisme européen ». 
•  L’adoption, par la Commission Européenne (par la Décision nº 2003/287/CE, de 14 avril 
2003), du label écologique communautaire – ECOLABEL – a eu une grande importance pour 
le tourisme. Tout opérateur touristique, qu’il s’agisse d’une chaîne d’hôtels ou d’un gîte rural, 
peut  demander  ce  label  écologique  (écolabel),  symbolisé  par  une  fleur,  à  condition  de 
satisfaire préalablement à des critères minimaux en matière environnementale et sanitaire. 
Ultérieurement, par la décision de 14 avril 2005 (2005/338/CE), la Commission Européenne a 
aussi adopté les critères pour accorder le label écologique pour les services offerts par les 
hébergements en plein air. 
•  Parmi les nouvelles initiatives de la Commission, la Communication intitulée « Une nouvelle 
politique européenne du tourisme : renforcer le partenariat pour le tourisme en Europe » a 
joué  un  rôle  important  dans  le  domaine  touristique.  Dans  cette  Communication,  la 
Commission européenne insiste sur la nécessité d’une réponse politique harmonisée au niveau 
de l’UE, aux défis auxquels le tourisme européen est confronté et propose l’amélioration de la 
réglementation  dans  ce  domaine,  par  une  compétitivité  accrue :  étendre  l’utilisation  des 
analyses d’impact aux nouvelles propositions, simplifier la législation européenne existante, 
consulter les différentes parties prenantes, dans le processus d’élaboration des politiques UE 
etc. 
•  En 2006, la Commission a lancé le Prix pour les « Destinations Touristiques d’Excellence », 
pour l’année 2007. Ce prix, accordé chaque année, est ouvert à tous les Etats membres et 
aussi aux pays candidats. Chaque pays participant à la compétition devra sélectionner une 